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A noncitizen facing deportation from the United States must obtain a stay of 
removal to avoid being deported while his federal appeal is pending.  In its 2009 
decision in Nken v. Holder, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the doctrinal 
standard for obtaining such a stay.1  However, key parts of the decision now 
stand on shaky ground because subsequent litigation has revealed that the 
Solicitor General’s Office misled the Court to believe that procedures were in 
place to bring wrongfully deported individuals back to the United States if they 
ultimately won their appeals.2  In addition, the federal circuit courts of appeal 
are split on how to apply the Nken standard. 
The government’s rush to deport first and resolve appeals later stems from a 
belief that many noncitizens abuse the appeals process to remain in the United 
States for a longer period of time.  This fear assumes that filing an appeal 
actually buys a significant amount of time.  The opening line of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion in Nken recognized the critical role of time, but could 
only vaguely note: “It takes time to decide a case on appeal.  Sometimes a little; 
sometimes a lot.”3  Unpacking fears of abuse therefore requires exploring how 
long the appellate process actually takes. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy lamented the lack of available 
empirical data about how the federal courts of appeals actually handle stays of 
removal, recognizing that such data would help the Court analyze whether the 
standard for granting stays is fair and effective.4  This Article presents new 
empirical data that shows that common assumptions about the duration of 
immigration appeals are actually false.  The government’s arguments to the 
Supreme Court about the danger that stays of removal pose were founded on 
these misperceptions.  This new data should affect how liberally appellate courts 
                                                 
 1. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009). 
 2. Jess Bravin, Immigration Case Challenges Justice Department’s Credibility, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 13, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020396 
1204577272053518420934. 
 3. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 4. Id. at 1762–63 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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grant stays of removal and assist the Supreme Court in resolving the circuit split 
over the application of the Nken standard. 
As immigration cases proceed from immigration courts to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, adjudicators at every 
level must strike a delicate balance between avoiding undue delay and 
preventing errant deportations.  Federal appellate courts in particular must walk 
this tightrope with enormous care because effectively they are the last barrier to 
removal.  These courts face the formidable challenge of deciding whether to 
grant a stay at the very beginning of the appeal, before having an opportunity to 
thoroughly examine the issues in the case.  Moreover, the stakes are often 
extremely high.  For example, if the judge errs in an asylum case, the petitioner 
could be sent to a country in which she faces a risk of persecution or torture. 
The circuit courts deal with these challenges differently.  Some grant stays of 
removal fairly liberally, while others grant them only rarely.5  These variations 
are associated with different approaches to applying the standard for stays of 
removal.6  In Nken, the Supreme Court held that the traditional four-part test for 
preliminary injunctions applies to stays of removal, rejecting a more stringent 
standard.7  Yet the circuit courts remain divided over whether to use a “sliding 
scale” approach in applying the four-part test, with which a stronger showing on 
one factor permits a lesser showing on another, or a strict, sequential approach, 
which involves analyzing each factor independently.8  We previously found that 
courts using the “sliding scale” approach produce fewer “false negatives” (cases 
in which the stay was denied but the appeal was ultimately granted), thereby 
protecting more people from wrongful deportations.9  However, the sliding scale 
approach also correlates to a higher number of “false positives” (cases in which 
the stay was granted but the appeal was ultimately denied), allowing many 
noncitizens to delay valid deportations.10  The Supreme Court must therefore 
strike a difficult balance to clarify the doctrinal standard for granting stays. 
To shed light on the real potential for undue delay that results from granting 
a stay of removal, we collected information from over 1600 cases in the eleven 
federal circuit courts that hear immigration petitions.11  Our data indicate that in 
most circuits, delay is less of a concern than previously thought.  We found that 
the average processing time for an immigration appeal was under nine months, 
and cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or procedural reasons—as frivolous 
appeals are more likely to be—were usually resolved in less than six months.  
                                                 
 5. See Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of 
Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 341 (2014). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761–62 (2009). 
 8. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 350–51. 
 9. Id. at 341. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The D.C. Circuit does not contain an immigration court, so the circuit does not have 
jurisdiction over petitions for review of removal orders and was therefore omitted from our study. 
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These results suggest that concerns about delay are overblown and that the risk 
of wrongful deportation is the more urgent issue that courts should consider in 
setting the standard for granting stays. 
Our analysis also demonstrates the importance of court management in 
understanding how the wheels of justice actually turn.  The doctrinal standard 
for granting a stay of removal is only part of the equation.  Courts must also 
consider the implications of different procedures that can expedite or delay 
cases.  Our examination of the duration of appeals, circuit by circuit, revealed 
different patterns in the speeds of adjudication.  For example, focusing on the 
two circuits that handle over 70% of all immigration appeals, we found that 
nearly half of the Ninth Circuit’s cases are resolved in less than six months, 
whereas only about 25% of the Second Circuit’s cases are resolved in that time 
period.  These differences appear to result from different case management 
practices.12  Although the government argued to the Supreme Court in Nken that 
the Ninth Circuit is opening the door to abuse of the appellate process,13 this 
concern actually appears far more valid in the Second Circuit, where cases take 
much longer to resolve.  In the Ninth Circuit, there seems to be little harm in 
granting stays of removal liberally because the court disposes of frivolous cases 
fairly quickly. 
At the same time, this study demonstrates that strategies designed to increase 
efficiency in adjudicating motions may compromise the quality of  
decision-making.  These procedures include reducing the size of the panel that 
decides the stay motion, streamlining the process for voting in ways that may 
reduce the level of independent scrutiny, lessening the amount of explanation (if 
any) provided in the decision, and increasing the reliance on staff attorneys to 
pre-screen cases.  As courts strive to strike the correct balance between 
protecting a noncitizen’s right to a meaningful appeal and preventing abuse of 
the legal process, they should pay attention to available data on the impact of 
these different procedural practices. 
Part I of the Article shows that frivolous immigration filings are a major 
governmental concern and explores various theories proposed by the 
government and some judges to explain how and why noncitizens may abuse the 
appellate process to buy time.  It exposes the weaknesses in these theories and 
proposes alternative explanations for certain behavior of noncitizen litigants.  
Part II presents the key findings from our empirical study of the duration of 
immigration appeals and illustrates the implications for courts concerned with 
the potential for abuse.  Finally, Part III offers recommendations to the executive 
and judicial branches to address these concerns. 
                                                 
 12. The Ninth and Second Circuits are the only two courts that offer temporary protection 
from removal to any petitioner who requests a temporary stay.  See infra Part II.F. (discussing the 
case management procedures of the Second and Ninth Circuits). 
 13. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762–63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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I.  STAYS OF REMOVAL AND THE FEAR OF DELAY 
For decades, the government has expressed concerns about noncitizens filing 
frivolous or fraudulent immigration applications to stay in the country.  Despite 
numerous efforts to deter such filings, the fear remains.  Concerns about abuse 
are especially acute appeals to the federal circuit courts, in part because 
frivolousness is particularly difficult to define at that level of adjudication.  
Consequently, the government has approached stays of removal with great 
caution.  Yet the government’s various theories of delay-seeking behavior do 
not withstand close scrutiny and contradict empirical evidence, suggesting that 
delay may not be the motivation of noncitizens to pursue federal appeals. 
A.  Efforts to Deter Frivolous Appeals 
The idea that would-be immigrants might abuse the courts to delay inevitable 
deportation stems from a general concern about immigration fraud.  Asylum 
fraud became a popular subject in 2011, after the woman who accused 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn of sexual assault admitted that she lied on her asylum 
application.14  The New York Times reported that asylum fraud schemes are 
common, describing the lawyers, notarios, and “chop shops” that peddle stock 
stories to immigrants who are desperately searching for ways to remain in the 
United States.15  The next month, the New Yorker published an article about 
asylum-seekers embellishing their experiences to strengthen their claims.16  
Serious investigations into asylum fraud followed, and, in 2012, twenty-six 
individuals, including six lawyers, were charged in the Southern District of New 
York for submitting hundreds of fabricated asylum applications on behalf of 
Chinese immigrants.17  Such accounts naturally foment fears that countless 
noncitizens are abusing the legal process.18 
Fears of frivolous and fraudulent immigration applications are not new.  They 
have plagued the government since asylum offices were first established in the 
United States in the early 1990s.19  Numerous regulatory and statutory changes 
                                                 
 14. Sam Dolnick, Asylum Ploys Play Off News to Open Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at 
A1, A19. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Suketu Mehta, The Asylum Seeker, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2011, at 32. 
 17. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Twenty-Six Individuals, 
Including Six Lawyers, Charged in Manhattan Federal Court With Participation in Immigration 
Fraud Schemes Involving Hundreds of Fraudulent Asylum Applications, (Dec. 18, 2012), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/December12/AsylumFraudChargesPR.php. 
 18. See, e.g., Diane Uchimiya, A Blackstone’s Ratio for Asylum: Fighting Fraud While 
Preserving Due Process for Asylum Seekers, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 383, 416 (2007) 
(discussing how immigration judges rely on general reports about asylum fraud in their decisions 
in individual cases). 
 19. See Gregg A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United States: 
Challenges and Opportunity, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 43, 51–52 (1994).  Far more people 
than expected began submitting asylum applications, which made the system appear vulnerable to 
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over the past two decades sought to address these concerns.  In 1995, the 
executive branch introduced regulatory changes aimed at curbing asylum 
fraud.20  In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
to render noncitizens who file frivolous asylum applications permanently 
ineligible for immigration benefits.21  In 2002, the Attorney General issued a 
regulation that allows a single member of the BIA to summarily dismiss an 
appeal that is “filed for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary 
delay” or that “lacks an arguable basis in fact or law.”22  In 2005, Congress 
passed the REAL ID Act, which demanded more corroborating evidence from 
asylum seekers and set a lenient standard for adverse credibility 
determinations.23  More recently, the BIA and circuit courts have repeatedly 
tried to clarify the standard for determining whether an asylum application is 
frivolous.24 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) permits a federal court to “discipline an 
attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or 
                                                 
abuse.  See id. at 50–51 (noting that “the system is ripe for fraud and abuse”); Tim Weiner, Pleas 
for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at A1. 
 20. Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or Withholding of 
Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779 (proposed Mar. 30, 1994) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 203, 208, 236, 242, 274a); see also David A. Martin, The 1995 Asylum 
Reforms, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (May 2000), www.cis.org/1995AsylumReforms.  The 
reforms attempted to address a backlog that made the system appear vulnerable to abuse by making 
processing of applications more efficient and delaying the availability of a work permit.  Id.; see 
also Deborah Anker, The Mischaracterized Asylum Crisis: Realities Behind Proposed Reforms, 9 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 29, 30–31 (1994) (discussing an empirical study by Harvard Law 
School’s immigration and refugee program that challenged public perceptions about abuse). 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4)(A), (d)(6); INA § 208(d)(4)(A), (d)(6).  The 1996 amendments also 
imposed a one-year filing deadline for asylum to discourage fraudulent applications.  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION 
EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 3 (2008), 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf.  Congress has 
since questioned “whether the resources expended on adjudicating the [one-year] rule outweigh its 
effectiveness in deterring fraud.”  Id. 
 22. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(D) (2013) (stating that a Board member may dismiss an appeal 
if he “is satisfied, from a review of the record, that the appeal is filed for an improper purpose, such 
as to cause unnecessary delay, or that the appeal lacks an arguable basis in fact or law unless the 
Board determines that it is supported by a good faith argument for extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law”).  The 2002 regulations also provide that an attorney who files a frivolous 
appeal may be subject to disciplinary action.  Id. § 1003.1(d)(2)(iii). 
 23. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 302, 302–03 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012)). 
 24. See, e.g., Yan Liu v. Holder, 640 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2011); Khadka v. Holder, 618 
F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010); Chen v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2008); Biao Yang 
v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 279 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (remanding for clarification by the 
BIA); Matter of X-M-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 322, 324 (BIA 2010); Matter of B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
236, 238–39 (BIA 2010); In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 157 (BIA 2007). 
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for failure to comply with any court rule.”25  Rule 46(c) provides a practical way 
to respond to abusive patterns of attorney behavior that are easier to identify and 
assess than the merits of an individual case.  Any given appeal may totter on the 
border between being frivolous or weak, but a pattern of failing to file briefs or 
respond to court orders is easier to catch.26  In some cases, such conduct may 
result from incompetence or an overwhelming caseload, but in other cases, the 
attorney may be filing meritless appeals simply to buy time for clients.27  Some 
courts have supplemented Rule 46(c) with local rules that impose harsh 
consequences and sanctions for specific types of abuses by both attorneys and 
pro se petitioners.28 
Flagrant attorney misuse of the appellate process may also result in state bar 
sanctions.  In 2010, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the suspension of a 
Memphis attorney who had filed eighteen immigration appeals with the Sixth 
Circuit and, in each case, had failed to pay the filing fees, file required forms, or 
submit an opening brief, resulting in dismissal of the appeals.29  Noting that the 
“filing of frivolous appeals ‘is a recurring problem in immigration practice,’”30 
the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the attorney had “exploited a 
procedural mechanism” and “abandoned the balance between zealously 
                                                 
 25. FED. R. APP. P. 46(c).  The Supreme Court held that conduct “unbecoming a member of 
the bar” may include any conduct that is “contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness 
to discharge continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the administration 
of justice.”  In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985). 
 26. The Second Circuit has publicly reprimanded attorneys who have filed abusive 
immigration appeals.  In one case in which the court issued a reprimand in a published decision, 
the attorney defaulted on scheduling orders in fourteen cases, withdrew a number of appeals after 
the briefing deadlines had passed, and filed a deficient brief that waived a dispositive argument.   
In re Payne, 707 F.3d 195, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2013).  In another case, the attorney had a history of 
missing deadlines and submitted a deficient brief in at least one case in which the motive to appeal 
was admittedly to gain time until another form of relief became available.  In re Guttlein, 378 F. 
App’x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 27. Concerns about attorneys’ dilatory behavior are not new.  An 1893 article published in 
the Yale Law Journal noted: 
There are two classes of lawyers who are always demanding delay.  First, those whose 
natural indolence resents any demand for action as a personal injury; second, the 
excessively busy ones who have managed to get under their control more cases than their 
time and strength will enable them to dispose of, and who remind one continually of a 
hen trying to hatch out more eggs than she can cover. 
Talcott H. Russel, The Law’s Delay, 2 YALE L.J. 95, 102 (1893).  The author appears to have 
overlooked the category of lawyers seeking delay on behalf of their clients. 
 28. See, e.g., SECOND CIR. LOCAL R. 31.2(d) (granting the court the power to “dismiss an 
appeal or take other appropriate action for failure to timely file a brief or to meet a deadline”); 
SECOND CIR. LOCAL R. 38.1 (“The court may, after affording notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
impose sanctions on a party that: (a) fails to file a brief, the appendix, or any required form within 
the time specified by FRAP or a rule or order of this court, or (b) takes or fails to take any other 
action for the purpose of causing unnecessary delay.”). 
 29. Flowers v. Bd. Of Prof’l Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tenn. 2010). 
 30. Id. at 897 (quoting Robert G. Heiserman & Linda K. Pacun, Professional Responsibility 
in Immigration Practice and Government Services, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 971, 980–81 (1985)). 
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representing his clients and the rules for the professional performance of his 
vocation.”31 
Although the Tennessee case is a fairly extreme example, federal courts still 
struggle to define frivolousness.  Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
38 grants the courts of appeals the authority to sanction appellants and attorneys 
who pursue “frivolous” appeals, but there is no clear test to for frivolity.32  
Courts remain divided over whether frivolousness can be defined simply by the 
objective “reasonably prudent attorney” test, or whether the attorney must also 
demonstrate bad faith.33 
One common approach is the actuarial approach, which defines frivolousness 
as a low likelihood of success, or by combining the likelihood of success with 
an estimate of the cost of litigation.34  This framework is best applied to civil 
suits for money damages.  The question is often whether the costs of litigation 
outweigh what is at stake in the case, and whether the transaction costs of 
litigation distort outcomes by leading to settlement of meritless cases.35  This 
quantitative approach to frivolousness does not represent how humans actually 
think about probabilities or how they make decisions.36  People will often pursue 
low probability cases if there is a remote prospect of a big reward.37  Moreover, 
in cases in which the stakes are extremely high—such as immigration cases, 
which risk the “loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth 
living”38—applying a traditional cost-benefit analysis is not possible. 
The general difficulty in defining, identifying, and responding to frivolous 
appeals explains why the government has approached stays of removal with such 
great caution.  In Nken, the government argued that noncitizens seek to 
                                                 
 31. Id. at 898; see also Bill Dries, Suspension Highlights Immigration Advocacy Issues, 
MEMPHIS DAILY NEWS, June 10, 2010, http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2010/jun 
/10/suspension-higlights-immigration-advocacy-issues//print (discussing the court’s opinion). 
 32. FED. R. APP. P. 38; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER 
& JOAN E. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3984.1 (4th ed. 2008) (noting the 
lack of clear test for frivolity). 
 33. See Scott A. Martin, Keeping Courts Afloat in a Rising Sea of Litigation: An Objective 
Approach to Imposing Rule 38 Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1156,  
1159–61 (2002) (discussing the “reasonably prudent attorney” standard); Robert J. Martineau, 
Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 850 (1984) (elaborating 
on the requirement of bad faith). 
 34. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529–31 (1997). 
 35. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting 
the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 465 (2004) (describing the impact of 
attorney fees on the disposition of a case). 
 36. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 163, 188–89 (2000). 
 37. Guthrie explains that if a plaintiff has a 1% chance of winning $5000, the actuarial 
approach would suggest that the case should be worth fifty dollars.  Id.  But the vast majority of 
test subjects refuse a fifty-dollar settlement offer in this scenario, preferring to pursue the remote 
chance of winning a much larger prize.  Id. 
 38. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
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manipulate the courts to delay removal in many different ways.39  In an amicus 
brief, the Washington Legal Foundation more bluntly stated that “a  
court-imposed delay in removal is a victory for the alien.”40  In other words, 
from the government’s perspective, deportation delayed is justice denied.  Based 
in large part on its fear of delay-seeking behavior, the government argued for a 
stringent stay standard, adopted only by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, that 
required “clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such 
[removal] order is prohibited as a matter of law.”41  This standard reflected the 
government’s view that a stay should be an “extraordinary remedy.”42 
Although the Court rejected the clear and convincing standard and held that 
the traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctions applies to stays of 
removal,43 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion acknowledged the tension 
between efficient execution of removal orders and the time required for quality 
decision-making.44  Yet the opening lines of the opinion suggest that quality 
adjudication comes first.  The Court stressed that holding a ruling in abeyance 
provides adequate time for an appellate court to decide a case on the merits.45  It 
also cautioned that “[t]he choice for a reviewing court should not be between 
justice on the fly or participation in what may be an idle ceremony.”46 
B.  Theories of Maximum and Specific Delay 
Although Nken generally discussed the critical role of time, the Court never 
explicitly addressed the government’s argument that noncitizens abuse the 
appellate process to delay deportation.  This may have been a tactical choice to 
avoid highlighting concerns about abusive appeals in a decision that adopted the 
more lenient of two proposed standards for stays.  The Court also lacked the 
empirical data to effectively evaluate this argument.47 
                                                 
 39. Brief for the Respondent at 10, Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (No. 08-681), 
2009 WL 45980 at *10. 
 40. Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Respondent at 7, Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (No. 08-681), 2009 WL 75556 at 
*7. 
 41. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756. 
 42. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 46 (quoting Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008)). 
 43. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)) (“[A] 
court considers four factors: ‘(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; 
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.’”). 
 44. Id. at 1756–57 (“The parties and the public, while entitled to both careful review and a 
meaningful decision, are also generally entitled to the prompt execution of orders that the 
legislature has made final.”). 
 45. Id. at 1754. 
 46. Id. at 1757 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942)). 
 47. Id. at 1762–63 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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In the Nken briefs, the government vaguely discussed the issue of delay 
without explaining why and how motivation to delay leads certain immigrants 
to file frivolous appeals in federal court.48  One argument is that immigrants 
simply wish to remain in the United States for as long as possible, and therefore 
attempt to lengthen the adjudication process in any way possible.  However, this 
was not actually the theory that the executive branch promoted in the years 
leading up to Nken. 
By 2009, the courts were concerned with the number immigration cases on 
the federal appellate docket.  Petitions to the federal courts surged after the 
Attorney General initiated reforms of the BIA in 2002 that streamlined its 
decision-making, allowing single-member panels to affirm the decisions of 
immigration judges.49  Critics claim that the surge in appeals to the court was 
the consequence of lower-quality decisions by the BIA after streamlining.50  In 
response, the government argued that the increase in appeals resulted from a 
desire by noncitizens to delay deportation.51  However, the simple desire to delay 
deportation for as long as possible does not explain the post-2002 surge in 
appeals because noncitizens could delay deportation by appealing to the federal 
courts even before streamlining.  The theory that noncitizens seek maximum 
delay thus cannot explain the increase in immigration appeals after BIA 
streamlining. 
As a result, the government developed a more nuanced theory of delay, 
suggesting that immigrants seek to stay in the United States for a specific period 
of time to earn a certain amount of money before returning home.52  According 
                                                 
 48. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 35–36 (quoting Teshhome-Gebreegziabher v. 
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2008, abrogated by Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1749). 
 49. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 
67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 50. Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining 
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 999, 1008 (2006) (citing 
E-Mail from Larry Levine, Counsel for Legislative and Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Stuart Drown, City Editor, The Sacramento Bee (Sept. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/LtrtoEditorSacBee.pdf). 
 51. Id. (citing Exec. Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures (Mar. 9 2006), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/eoir/press/06/BIAStreamliningFactSheet030906.htm. 
 52. See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 431–32 (2009).  Second Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman explained that 
[o]ne theory for the increased rate of appeal holds that the BIA’s streamlined procedures 
were largely responsible because they drastically reduced the time an alien could expect 
to remain in this country while his or her case languished in the administrative process. 
Many aliens, this theory maintains, hope to remain here for about five years in order to 
earn money for themselves and relatives back home. With their cases moving through 
the administrative process in less than one year, a petition for review in a court of appeals, 
with the likely prospect of a stay of removal while the petition was pending, afforded 
hope of maintaining a five year residence in this country with the petition remaining in 
the judicial process for four years. 
Id. 
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to the theory of specific delay, if the BIA process took longer, more noncitizens 
were able to achieve their specific desired period of delay without resort to the 
federal courts; once the BIA became faster, they had to appeal to the next level 
to achieve the same period of delay.53  This specific delay theory built on the 
unquestioned fact that the 2002 reforms did make the BIA faster.  In 2000, it 
took the BIA an average of 1,100 days (roughly three years) to decide appeals.54  
By 2006, an appeal to the BIA took an average of only 400 days (just over one 
year).55 
Nevertheless, the specific delay hypothesis has several flaws.  First, it predicts 
that the longer the BIA takes to decide a case, the less likely the noncitizen is to 
appeal to the federal courts, and, the faster the BIA decides, the more likely the 
noncitizen is to file a petition for review.  Yet previous research has shown that 
the opposite is true.  In cases in which the BIA takes longer to decide a case, the 
noncitizen is more likely to appeal to the circuit court.56 
Second, the specific delay theory does not explain why noncitizens appeal 
from detention, as they often cannot gain anything by appealing except more 
time in confinement.57  If immigration detainees consented to removal from the 
country, they could escape detention much sooner.  However, appeals from 
detainees to the BIA increased by 28% from 2007 to 2011, suggesting that a 
genuine desire to avoid deportation, rather than prolonging the case for a certain 
period of time to earn money in the United States, may in fact be the primary 
motivation for appeals.58 
Third, the specific delay theory does not explain why most noncitizens never 
pursue any type of appeal at all.  In 2011, noncitizens appealed only 8% of 
                                                 
 53. See John R. B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why are So Many 
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?  An Empirical 
Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5 (2005). 
 54. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 50 & fig.8.  Detained cases, in particular, have been 
processed more quickly since streamlining.  In 2009, the BIA Chairman reported that detained cases 
must be completed within 150 days, but they are usually completed within ninety-five days.  Maria 
Baldini-Potermin, Practice Before the Board of Immigration Appeals: Recent Roundtable and 
Additional Practice Tips, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2009, 2011 (2009). 
 55. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 50. 
 56. Palmer et al., supra note 53, at 54–55, 65 (“We found that the pool of sampled BIA 
decisions that were challenged in petitions for review were, on average, older than the pool of 
sampled BIA decisions that were not challenged.  The mean age of the pool of decisions that were 
challenged in petitions for review was 1276 days (3.5 years), while the mean age of the BIA 
decision that were not challenged was 1051 days (2.9 years).”). 
 57. The Ninth Circuit permits a detained petitioner who is granted a stay of removal by the 
court to seek a bond hearing before the immigration judges and be released.  See Casas-Castrillon 
v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942, 948 (2008).  Most other circuits have not 
followed this approach. 
 58. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK W1 (2012) [hereinafter FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf. 
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immigration court decisions to the BIA59 and filed only 6,300 petitions for 
review with the federal appellate courts.60  That same year, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) removed 396,906 people from the United States.61  
Even if many appeals are frivolous, they do not frustrate the government’s 
general ability to enforce immigration laws.  In fact, the appellate process is 
marginal to the overall scale of immigration enforcement in the United States.  
Figure 1 below demonstrates the paucity of appeals.62 




                                                 
 59. Id. at X1.  Both the Department of Homeland Security and the respondent noncitizen may 
appeal to the BIA in removal cases.  Id.  In 2011, the BIA received at total of 27,237.  Id. at S2.  
Noncitizens filed 17,090 of those appeals.  Id. at X1. 
 60. See U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 58 (2011) [hereinafter 
NINTH CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/Annual 
Report2011.pdf (noting that the Ninth Circuit handled 2,963 BIA appeals, close to 47% of BIA 
appeals filed nationwide in 2011). 
 61. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key 
Priorities Including Threats to Public Safety and National Security (Oct. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm. 
 62. Id.; FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 58, at S2, X1; NINTH CIRCUIT 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 58. 
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Finally, only about half of the noncitizens who appeal to the circuit courts 
actually request a stay of removal.63  This is true for both pro se and represented 
petitioners.64  In three circuits, more than 60% of petitioners never request a stay, 
and in five circuits only around half do so.65  This data contradicts the theory 
that the desire to delay deportation drives noncitizens to go to court because half 
never even ask the court to stay their removal. 
There are alternative explanations for the increase in federal appeals.  First, as 
the BIA became more efficient at deciding cases, it also grew less likely to rule 
in favor of noncitizens.  According to a Government Accountability Office 
report, “BIA decisions favoring the alien were almost 50 percent lower 
(declining from 21 percent to 10 percent) in the 4 ½ years following the 2002 
streamlining compared with the 4 ½ years preceding it.”66  Consequently, there 
were simply more BIA decisions to appeal after 2002, and immigrants and their 
advocates had more reason to doubt that the BIA provided them a fair 
opportunity.  These factors naturally led to more petitions for review in the 
federal courts. 
Another possible explanation for the increase in appeals is that the BIA’s new 
“affirmance without opinion” procedure left noncitizens feeling as though the 
Agency did not properly review their cases, which may have led them to seek 
review from the federal courts more often.  The BIA used its authority to affirm 
without opinion 44% of the asylum cases it reviewed between March 2002 and 
October 2006, and entered final orders of removal in 77% of those cases.67  Thus, 
more cases were ripe for appeal after 2002, more BIA decisions ended 
unfavorably for noncitizens, and petitioners had concrete procedural reasons to 
believe that they had been denied a fair and meaningful review of their cases.68 
                                                 
 63. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 368. 
 64. Id. at 370 (noting that pro se petitioners request stays at a rate comparable to represented 
petitioners). 
 65. Id. at 370–71. 
 66. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 10. 
 67. Id. 
 68. In addition, the 2002 procedural reforms led to numerous federal court challenges about 
the process itself, raising novel legal issues about the validity of the rulemaking and the legality of 
affirmances without opinion.  See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on 
Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 46–47 (2007); see also Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, Study Conducted  
for: The American Bar Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono  
Re: Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management 31–37 (July 
22, 2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Publication/e649960f-30c0-408f-8965-0df60 
4f69523/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/690ec02a-94b9-4115-a1a0-5d14cf0d7a6d/Dorsey 
StudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf. 
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C.  Stays as an Incentive to Appeal 
In Nken, the government argued that both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits 
granted stays too leniently.69  In his concurring opinion, Justice  
Kennedy—joined by Justice Scalia—sympathized with the government’s 
concerns that the Ninth Circuit may be too lenient.70  Although the government 
did not offer any data to support its allegation about the Seventh Circuit, it 
claimed that noncitizens in the Ninth Circuit appeal BIA decisions 42% of the 
time, while noncitizens in the Eleventh Circuit appeal in only 9% of cases.71  The 
government hypothesized that the availability of a temporary automatic stay in 
the Ninth Circuit incentivized appeals in that jurisdiction, whereas the Eleventh 
Circuit’s comparatively restrictive approach to granting stays discouraged 
abusive appeals.72 
The government’s theory is difficult to test because only limited data is 
available about the actual rates of immigration appeals in various circuits.  The 
most recent study that examined rates of immigration appeals, performed by 
John R. B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin, used data 
from 2004.73  This study showed that the appeal rates ranged from 9% in the 






                                                 
 69. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 36, 47–48.  Our data, which only included 
cases decided after Nken, showed that the Seventh Circuit actually granted a modest 31% of stay 
requests.  Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 364–65.  While it is possible that the Seventh 
Circuit changed its practice substantially after the decision, we think this is unlikely because the 
court retained its sliding scale approach and a “low” threshold for the likelihood of success.  Id. 
 70. See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1763 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 71. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 36. 
 72. Id. at 36.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s General Order 6.4(c), which was issued in 2002, the 
petitioner receives a temporary automatic stay upon filing the motion for stay.  If the government 
fails to respond to the motion or files a notice of non-opposition, then the temporary stay continues 
during the pendency of the appeal. If the government opposes the stay, then the court rules on the 
motion.  The Court does not set a briefing schedule in the case until the motion for stay is resolved, 
thereby delaying the litigation.  9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c). 
 73. Palmer et al., supra note 53. 
 74. Id. at 54.  Because our study reports averages of all of the circuits but not the national 
total average, we have computed the same figure based on the Palmer et al. study’s data. 
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FIGURE 2: RATES OF APPEAL OF BIA DECISIONS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
2004 (PALMER, YALE-LOEHR & CRONIN)75 
 
Our dataset, which begins with cases decided in 2009, did not allow us to 
calculate rates of appeal because we examined only appellate courts’ dockets 
and therefore could not calculate what percentage of BIA orders were 
appealed.76  However, we compared the rates of appeal calculated by Palmer and 
his colleagues with the rates of stay grants in a previous study, and there does 
not appear to be a connection.  While the Eleventh Circuit is a low extreme for 
both variables, the Eighth Circuit had a high rate of appeal but a lower rate of 
stay requests and stay grants.  The Seventh Circuit grants stays at a high rate, 
but has a low rate of appeal and a relatively low rate of stay requests.  In the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, which offer some type of temporary automatic stay, 
we found that nearly all petitioners requested stays, but the rates of appeal 
Palmer and his colleagues reported were only moderately higher than in most 
other circuits.77  These disparities suggest a need for further research and 
indicate that noncitizens file federal court appeals in immigration cases for 
different and complicated reasons.78 
                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. The Executive Office of Immigration Review reports the number of appeals received by 
the BIA, but does not report the number of removal orders issued.  See FY 2011 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK, supra note 58, at S1.  Because a noncitizen would only appeal an order of removal, 
without this data it is difficult to determine if current figures are similar with those in 2004. 
 77. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 74, at 54 (reporting that the Second and Ninth 
Circuits were among five circuits with appeal rates over 30% but under 50%). 
 78. Previous research that explored the reasons for the variations among the circuits in the 
rates of immigration appeals has been inconclusive.  Id. at 71–80. 
CIRCUIT APPEAL RATE 
Average of all circuits 34% 
1st Cir. 23% 
2d Cir. 42% 
3d Cir. 34% 
4th Cir 27% 
5th Cir. 24% 
6th Cir. 36% 
7th Cir. 28% 
8th Cir. 60% 
9th Cir. 45% 
10th Cir. 28% 
11th Cir.  9% 
694 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:679 
There are many possible reasons why the Ninth Circuit has an especially high 
appeal rate.  The Ninth Circuit’s body of immigration case law may be perceived 
as more favorable to noncitizens than the case law of other circuits, which may 
encourage noncitizens to file appeals in the Ninth Circuit rather than in other 
courts.  Another possible explanation relates to localized differences in the 
immigration bar in different metropolitan areas.  Immigration lawyers may not 
behave the same way in all regions, and differences among a relatively small 
number of practitioners can have a substantial impact on the number of cases 
filed.79  Furthermore, some lawyers change their behavior in response to 
particular events, such as BIA streamlining.80  The Ninth Circuit has seventeen 
immigration courts, but the courts in Los Angeles and San Francisco handled 
approximately 38% of the removal proceedings in the Circuit in 2011.81  This 
means that if the immigration lawyers in these two cities are especially 
aggressive in filing appeals, the appeal rate for the Circuit could appear 
significantly higher, even if cases in the other fifteen courts followed the national 
average.82 
Until now, the theory that immigrants file appeals just to buy time has been 
fertile ground for speculation because it was easy to assume that the federal court 
process takes a long time.  However, our empirical data show that an appeal to 
a federal court may be the fastest part of the immigration adjudication system, 
and that federal courts often resolve weak cases quickly.  Our findings belie 
concerns that federal courts are vulnerable to systemic abuse, or at least indicate 
that if frivolous appeals are being filed, they are likely delaying deportation by 
only a few months. 
II.  EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DURATION OF APPEALS 
A.  Methodology 
Our study analyzed 1646 immigration cases throughout the eleven circuits 
that handle immigration appeals.  We found these cases through the Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) service, which provides on-line 
access to federal court records.  Because orders on stays are interim decisions, 
we could only access them by looking into individual case dockets in PACER; 
such interim decisions generally are not available through Westlaw or Lexis.  
PACER also helped us create a superior sample because it includes all 
immigration cases, whereas Westlaw and Lexis select which cases to include in 
their databases. 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 89 (noting that a small group of lawyers can account for the majority of immigration 
petitions in a single circuit). 
 80. Id. at 88. 
 81. FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 58, at B6. 
 82. Id. 
2014] Buying Time?  False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals 695 
Importantly, our datasets83 included not only cases decided on the merits, but 
also cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for procedural reasons, such as 
failure to file a brief or pay the required fees, or cases voluntarily dismissed by 
the petitioner.  We included data of such dismissals so that we could compare 
the duration of cases decided on the merits with the duration of cases dismissed 
for other reasons.  This data is critical to calculating the amount of delay that 
results from the filing of potentially frivolous or abusive appeals.  Our data thus 
provide a more complete picture of the circuit courts’ immigration dockets than 
other studies that examine only cases decided on the merits.84 
We calculated the duration of an appeal by using the date that the case was 
opened (“docketed”) in PACER (the date that the petition for review was filed), 
and the date that the case was closed (“termed”) in PACER (the date that the 
judgment was entered or the petition dismissed).85  In addition to recording the 
dates necessary to measure duration, we recorded other variables visible on the 
                                                 
 83. We used two overlapping datasets for the analyses in this Article.  The first dataset is a 
random sample of 100 immigration appeals in each circuit that were filed after April 22, 2009, 
when the Supreme Court decided Nken, and that have been resolved by the courts.  We also 
collected a supplemental dataset of cases in which the petitioner requested a stay of removal.  We 
collected enough additional cases such that we ended up with approximately one hundred cases per 
circuit in which a stay was requested.  In some circuits with relatively small numbers of immigration 
appeals, we could not find one hundred cases in which stays had been requested and where a final 
decision had been made on the petition for review between the date that Nken was issued and the 
present.  We used the first random sample of one hundred cases to analyze stay request rates, or 
other empirical questions that required us to distinguish between cases with and without stay 
requests.  We used the supplemental sample of one hundred cases per circuit with stay requests to 
analyze whether stays are granted. 
 84. Cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip J. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 405 (2007) (choosing to include only 
cases decided on the merits). 
 85. The closing dates recorded in PACER do not include the additional period of time for a 
mandate to issue, although the date that the mandate issued is apparent from the docket.  The 
mandate provides official notice of the court’s decision to the BIA; it is not a judgment.  Because 
the court retains control of the case until the mandate is issued, it may not be clear why we did not 
go by the date that the mandate was issued to measure the duration of an appeal.  The reason is that 
the date of the mandate depends on whether post-judgment filings are made. 
  Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, if one of the parties is a United States 
officer sued in an official capacity—which is the case in immigration appeals since the respondent 
is always the Attorney General—a petition for rehearing may be filed within forty-five days after 
entry of the judgment.  FED. R. APP. P. 40(a)(1).  This time can be shortened or extended by local 
court rules.  Id.  If neither party seeks rehearing, then the mandate must issue seven days after the 
period for seeking rehearing expires.  FED. R. APP. P. 41(b).  A party may also move to stay the 
mandate for ninety days pending the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.  
If the petition for the writ is actually filed, then the stay continues until the Supreme Court’s final 
disposition.  Using the date that the mandate is issued as the “end” date of the appeal would 
therefore greatly distort the amount of time that it actually takes the court to resolve the appeal.  
Moreover, local rules governing the time period for requesting rehearing would affect our 
comparison of how long it takes different circuit courts to decide immigration appeals.  We 
therefore used the date that the judgment was entered, which is consistent with how PACER records 
the end of an appeal. 
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PACER dockets that we suspected could have an impact on duration.  These 
included: whether a stay was requested; whether the government opposed the 
stay; whether the court granted the stay; whether the petitioner was represented 
or pro se; whether the petitioner filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis; 
the type of case; whether the case was scheduled for oral argument; the political 
composition and size of the panels that ruled on the stay and the petition for 
review; and how the case was resolved—whether it was decided on the merits 
or dismissed for other reasons, namely lack of jurisdiction, procedural flaws, or 
voluntarily.  We used these variables to develop a linear regression model for 
the duration of immigration appeals, which shows the change in duration 
predicted by a given factor. 
B.  Average Duration of Immigration Appeals 
Across the circuits, we found that immigration appeals took an average of 8.8 
months.86  Previous studies suggested an average duration of one year for 
immigration petitions in the circuit courts.87  One explanation for this 
discrepancy is the omission of non-merits dismissals in studies that relied on 
databases like Westlaw and Lexis; we were able to capture such dismissals by 
using the PACER dockets.  Our findings show that only the Second and Sixth 
Circuits took an average one year or longer to adjudicate immigration appeals.  
Several circuits took only seven months.  These results demonstrate that, for 
most circuits, common perceptions of the duration of immigration appeals are 
wrong.  The average duration of immigration appeals in each circuit is presented 
in Figure 3 below. 
                                                 
 86. This number is the average of all the circuits.  It is not a national average because far more 
immigration appeals are concentrated in some circuits (for example, the Ninth and Second) than in 
others. 
 87. Palmer et al., supra note 53, at 82–85 (reporting data for the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh 
circuits). 
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FIGURE 3: AVERAGE DURATION OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS BY CIRCUIT 
 
 
C.  Factors That Affect the Duration of an Appeal 
Although averages provide useful information, they mask huge variations in 
the duration of individual appeals.  Some of the appeals in our sample lasted as 
little as a few weeks while others took two years.  Various factors affect the 
length of an appeal.88  Not surprisingly, we found that if an appeal is scheduled 
for oral argument, it takes approximately three months longer.89  These cases are 
the least likely to be frivolous because courts usually schedule oral argument 
only for particularly challenging cases and those that raise important legal issues.  
Asylum cases take an average of one month longer, perhaps because they tend 
to involve legally and factually complex issues.90  Pro se cases are resolved 
                                                 
 88. See Appendix A, infra, for the linear regression model predicting the duration of cases, 
in months. 
 89. See infra Appendix A.  While the delay caused by oral argument is relatively long, only 
a small percentage of the cases in our sample (9%) actually included oral argument, indicating that 
this factor does not affect the vast majority of appeals.  Courts also exert significant control over 
whether to schedule cases for oral argument.  For example, the Second Circuit does not schedule 
any immigration appeals for oral argument in order to process them more quickly.  See Erick 
Rivero, Note, Asylum and Oral Argument: The Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit 
Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497, 1521 (2006) (arguing that the non-argument 
calendar violates due process).  Despite these efforts, the Second Circuit remains the slowest circuit. 
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almost two months faster than those with attorneys, possibly due to the 
difficulties pro se petitioners face in articulating a substantive appeal.91 
Most relevant to concerns about frivolousness is our finding that how the 
appeal is resolved—whether it is decided on the merits or dismissed for 
jurisdictional or procedural grounds—significantly affects duration.  Non-merits 
dismissals take almost three months less.  As shown in Figure 4 below, in most 
circuits, non-merits dismissals occur within just five to six months. 
FIGURE 4: DURATION OF PETITIONS (IN MONTHS) BASED ON HOW THEY ARE 
RESOLVED 
 
Generally the weakest cases—those with jurisdictional or procedural flaws 
that appear most frivolous on their face—are resolved much more quickly than 
the average appeal. We also note that some circuits act more quickly to deny 
petitions on the merits than to grant them.  The First Circuit takes an average of 
sixteen months to grant petitions, but just nine months to deny them on the 
merits.  Similarly, the Second Circuit takes seventeen months to grant and 
fourteen months to deny a petition on the merits.  These differences are 
consistent with the theory that it is easier—and therefore faster—for a court to 
affirm an agency decision than to vacate it.92  Interestingly, we did not observe 
                                                 
 91. See infra Appendix A. 
 92. See Thomas J. Miles, The Law’s Delay: A Test of the Mechanisms of Judicial Peer Effects, 
4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 301, 318 (2012) (indicating that courts tend to resolve cases faster when 
validating an agency decision than when reversing it).  The theory is that “[w]hen a court defers 
and validates an agency decision . . . its task is a less searching and demanding inquiry than when 
it declines to defer and fully engages in the substance of the agency’s decision.”  Id. at 317. 
2014] Buying Time?  False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals 699 
this pattern in most circuits, in which grants and denials on the merits took 
roughly the same amount of time.  In fact, when we combined the data from all 
circuits, we found no statistically significant difference in the duration of appeals 
granted and denied on the merits.93  These results suggest that all courts may 
actually defer to the BIA’s decisions, or that giving deference simply does not 
consistently speed up the adjudication for immigration cases.94  The Sixth 
Circuit actually took longer to deny a case on the merits than to grant it, which 
may reflect an emphasis on avoiding errant deportations. 
We found no evidence to validate the government’s concern that filing or 
adjudicating a stay drags out an appeal.95  Neither filing a motion for a stay, nor 
government opposition to the motion, nor the granting of a stay is associated 
with a significant increase in the duration of the case.  However, if we limit our 
sample only to appeals decided on the merits, our analysis shows that cases 
where stays were requested took an average of 1.65 months longer, which is 
statistically significant.96  Government opposition to the motion or the granting 
of a stay did not increase the duration of appeals decided on the merits.  Thus, 
for the subset of appeals decided on the merits, which already eliminates those 
most likely to be frivolous, the request for a stay is associated with only a small 
increase in the duration of the appeal.  Requesting a stay in a case that satisfies 
jurisdictional and procedural requirements may heighten the care that judges 
take in resolving the case.  However, have no basis for determining with 
certainty the explanation for these phenomena. 
D.  Disparities Among the Circuits in Closing Appeals Quickly 
Analyzing only averages obscures the fact that many circuit courts are adept 
at closing significant numbers of immigration cases in a very short amount of 
time.  Most circuits close at least 30% of immigration appeals in less than six 
months.  We also found that it is common for courts to be able to close 10% to 
20% of their immigration cases in less than three months. 
                                                 
 93. See infra Appendix B. 
 94. Our results are consistent with other empirical research that casts doubt on whether 
deferential standards of review actually have an impact on the results of administrative law cases.  
As one recent review of the research summarized, “[t]here is no empirical support for the 
widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays a major role in judicial review of agency actions.”  
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 77, 93 (2011).  In immigration cases specifically, some courts have expressed open 
objections to deferring to the BIA because of doubts about its decision-making.  See Adam B. Cox, 
Deference, Delegation and Immigration Law, 74. U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1683–84 (2007) (noting 
that Seventh Circuit Judge Posner does not defer to immigration courts); Michael Kagan, Dubious 
Deference: Reassessing Appellate Standards of Review in Immigration Appeals, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 
101, 121–23 (2012) (discussing the empirical literature that casts doubt on the impact of deference 
on adjudication in the immigration context). 
 95. See infra Appendix A. 
 96. See Appendix B, infra, for the linear regression model of the duration of cases decided on 
the merits, in months. 
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Categorizing cases into six-month bands (cases decided in less than six 
months, cases decided in six to twelve months, and so on) reveals that the circuits 
resolve immigration appeals in very different patterns.  For example, the Ninth 
Circuit closes immigration appeals in an average of ten months, while the 
Eleventh Circuit’s average is just 7.3 months.  However, in our sample of one 
hundred cases per circuit, the Ninth Circuit closed forty-seven cases in less than 
six months, compared to Eleventh Circuit’s thirty-six.  The Third Circuit was 
also slower than the Eleventh Circuit, with a mean duration of 9.3 months for 
immigration appeals.  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit closed twenty-one out of 
one hundred cases in less than three months, compared to the Eleventh Circuit’s 
five cases.  Figure 5 below shows the percentage of cases closed in zero to three 
months and in three to six months in each circuit.  The Ninth Circuit’s ability to 
close nearly half of its cases so quickly is remarkable because it receives more 
immigration petitions than any other circuit. 
FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS CLOSED IN 0–3 MONTHS 
AND 3–6 MONTHS 
 
E.  The Impact of Duration on Application Rates for Stays of Removal 
If immigrant petitioners are motivated by a desire for delay, and if the 
potential for delay varies from circuit to circuit, it is plausible that petitioners are 
more likely to request a stay of removal in the slower circuits.  Our data weakly 
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Overall, across all circuits, as the stay request rate increases, the average 
duration of cases increases.97  For each additional month of average duration, 
the stay request rate increases by 8%.98 
The cause of this relationship is difficult to determine.  The Second and Ninth 
Circuits account for much of the relationship because nearly every petitioner in 
those circuits requests a stay.  We reported in a separate study that the temporary 
stay of removal offered in these circuits is the most plausible explanation for the 
nearly 100% stay request rate.99  We also identified many other factors that 
correlate to an increased stay request rate, such as detention rates.  It is probable 
that stay requests lead to a longer duration rather than vice versa because stay 
requests are associated with an increase in the duration of merits-based 
decisions. 
F.  The Impact of Court Procedures on Delay 
Part of the reason that the circuits show such different patterns in processing 
time for immigration appeals is the different internal procedures that the courts 
use to screen out certain types of cases, especially on jurisdictional and 
procedural grounds, such as a petitioner’s failure to prosecute the appeal.  We 
were able to document this because the docket reports that we analyzed generally 
indicated whether a petition was denied for lack of jurisdiction or for procedural 
reasons, which allowed us to separate cases denied for a non-merits reason from 
those decided on the merits. 
Although all of the circuits tend to issue non-merits denials faster than other 
decisions, some circuits take longer to do so than others.  In the Eighth Circuit, 
fifteen of nineteen cases decided in less than three months were non-merits 
dismissals.  In the Fifth Circuit, twenty of twenty-three petitions finished in less 
than three months were non-merits dismissals.  By contrast, in the Sixth Circuit, 
twenty-one of twenty-six cases decided in less than eight months were non-
merits dismissals.  However, the Sixth Circuit decided just two cases out of our 
sample of one hundred in less than three months.  Thus, although the circuits 
may follow a similar pattern of issuing non-merits dismissals faster than merits-
based decisions, some circuits are particularly fast and may issue a dismissal in 
a matter of weeks in some cases and just a few months in many others. 
The way in which courts sort cases varies from circuit to circuit.  In many 
circuits, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, staff attorneys process cases recommended for screening and special 
panels decide those cases.100  However, there are some notable differences and 
                                                 
 97. See Appendix C, infra, for the bivariate relationship between the stay grant rate and the 
average duration of appeals. 
 98. The bivariate correlation is rho = 0.6845 (p  = 0.0202, n=11) when we include all circuits. 
 99. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 392. 
 100. See John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience in the 
Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REV. 859, 866–67 (1991). 
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exceptions.  For example, the Third Circuit is unique in sending all cases to 
argument panels without any staff input on screening cases for oral argument or 
for complexity.101  Similarly, standing immigration panels review all of the 
immigration cases in the Third Circuit.102  The Sixth Circuit uses staff attorneys 
to screen cases, but then routes screening recommendations to regular arguments 
panels that must the cases into their daily calendars.103  Moreover the Second 
and Ninth Circuits manage their immigration dockets differently, which 
influences the duration of their cases.  Because these two circuits hear most of 
the country’s immigration appeals, we believe their procedures warrant greater 
scrutiny. 
1.  Efficiency Though Screening: The Ninth Circuit 
It is logical to expect courts with relatively small immigration dockets to 
complete cases faster than those with large dockets.  However, there is a stark 
contrast between the Second and Ninth Circuits, which together handle nearly 
75% of the immigration appeals nationwide.  The Ninth Circuit alone handled 
47% of all the BIA appeals filed nationally in 2011.104  While the Ninth Circuit 
closes nearly half of its immigration petitions in less than six months, the Second 
Circuit closes relatively few cases so quickly.  Figure 6 below portrays the 
different patterns of adjudication in these two courts. 
                                                 
 101. See id. at 867; Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case 
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 337 (2011). 
 102. See Levy, supra note 101, at 338. 
 103. See Oakley, supra note 100, at 867. 
 104. NINTH CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 58. 
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FIGURE 6: PATTERNS OF ADJUDICATION IN THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS 
 
 
If we define speed by the percentage of cases closed in less than six months, 
the Ninth Circuit is the second fastest in the country and the Second Circuit is 
the second slowest.  The Ninth Circuit closes some cases in less than three 
months, while the Second Circuit almost never closes a case that quickly.  
Similarly, while the plurality of immigration appeals in the Second Circuit drag 
on for more than a year, the Ninth Circuit typically closes comparable cases in 
less than half of a year, and, in a significant number of cases, in just a few weeks. 
When a noncitizen files a motion for stay of removal in the Ninth 
 Circuit—usually at the same time as the petition for review—the court promptly 
sets dates by which the government must file the certified administrative record 
and respond to the motion.105  Any dispositive motions, such as motions to 
dismiss, are due at the same time as the response to the motion for stay, which 
is eighty-four days from the filing of the original motion.106  These deadlines are 
strictly enforced.107  We observed that the Ninth Circuit also uses Orders to 
Show Cause (OSCs) fairly aggressively to weed out appeals for which 
jurisdiction is questionable, or for procedural reasons such as failure to pay the 
                                                 
 105. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c)(3). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (stating that the court will not entertain any motions for an extension of time to respond 
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filing fee.108  If the petitioner fails to provide a satisfactory response, the staff 
attorney can set the case for consideration by a “motions and screening panel” 
of judges, which usually results in expeditious dismissal of the case, sometimes 
even before the government’s deadline for responding to the stay motion.109 
The Ninth Circuit also increases its efficiency through a case weighting 
system.  Staff attorneys designate certain cases to be resolved under well-settled 
law as “screening cases.”110  The court assigns a “case weight” to each appeal 
based on its perceived degree of difficulty to more evenly allocate the time-
consuming cases so that the most complex cases are not all assigned to the same 
judges.111  As Professor Anna O. Law explained: 
This weighting system also dictates how the cases are calendared and 
whether the cases are placed on an oral argument track or on a 
screening track.  The former, which may not literally mean that 
counsel will engage in oral argument before the judges, nevertheless 
means that the appeal will receive more attention from judges rather 
than staff.  The latter means that an appeal will receive less judicial 
scrutiny and is characterized by heavy staff involvement. . . .  The 
screening track . . . is meant for appeals that are regarded as 
straightforward and therefore easy, or appeals that are perceived as 
frivolous or hopeless.112 
Although the Ninth Circuit began developing this system in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and did not design it specifically for immigration cases, it is helpful 
in this area because of the large volume of appeals.113  The Ninth Circuit’s “Pro 
Se Unit” is another factor in its efficient disposition of immigration cases.  
Created in 1992 as a response to a dramatic increase in pro se cases, this unit, 
comprised of one staff attorney and several paralegals, processes all pro se 
appeals in civil and habeas corpus cases.114  If the unit believes that an appeal is 
frivolous or has a flaw that requires dismissal, it immediately prepares an order 
for the Motions and Screening Panel to review.115 
                                                 
 108. See id. 6.4(c)(5) (discussing Orders to Show Cause); see also Honorable J. Clifford 
Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide Through Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 187, 192–93 (2005) (explaining that staff attorneys in the Ninth Circuit’s 
“Motions Unit” are responsible for reviewing every appeal filed and issue Orders to Show Cause 
directing the party to explain how the court has jurisdiction). 
 109. See Wallace, supra note 108, at 193.  The motions and screening panel dedicates one 
week each month to decide all pending motions and screening cases to determine which require 
oral argument.  Id. at 198–99. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 196–97. 
 112. ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 160 (2010). 
 113. Id. at 158–59. 
 114. Cathy A. Catterson, The Role of the Staff in the Operation of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 391 (2000); Wallace, supra note 108, at 194. 
 115. Wallace, supra note 108, at 194.  The Pro Se Unit also monitors cases for inactivity to 
determine whether dismissal is required based on failure to prosecute.  Id. at 195.  In addition, the 
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The Ninth Circuit’s system has clear efficiency benefits, but it also generates 
significant concerns.  After 2002, the majority of immigration appeals were 
routed for screening panels, including all pro se cases.116  As a consequence, 
these cases are far more likely to eventually be rejected.  In 2001, 31% of pro se 
applications for asylum were successful in the Ninth Circuit.117  By 2005, the 
success rate had dropped to 5%.118 
A critical but somewhat invisible part of the case screening system is the 
courts’ heavy reliance on staff attorneys rather than judges to direct the flow of 
cases and to determine what kind of judicial attention each case receives.  
Professor Law concluded that in the Ninth Circuit the staff suffered the ultimate 
burden of the heavy caseload, not the judges.119  In anonymous interviews with 
Ninth Circuit judges, she found considerable ambivalence about the system and 
reported complaints that judges have inadequate time to evaluate cases and a 
sense of resignation that the court has no alternative.120 
2.  An Alternative Perspective: The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit, which has the second-largest immigration docket, took 
the longest to adjudicate immigration appeals.  In many ways, this Circuit is an 
innovator in the handling of its immigration docket, but its procedures result in 
a very long timeline for resolution of petitions.  This longer timeline, coupled 
with an informal provision for temporary automatic stays, leaves the Second 
Circuit the most vulnerable to abuse of the appellate process.  At the same time, 
the Circuit has developed an alternative perspective on immigration appeals that 
merits serious consideration. 
The Second Circuit was forced to radically reform its traditional practice of 
holding oral arguments in the majority of cases because of the surge of 
immigration appeals after the BIA reforms of 2002.121  In 2005, the Second 
Circuit implemented a new local rule that created a Non-Argument Calendar 
(NAC) for appeals challenging the denial of asylum and related relief, provided 
                                                 
unit tracks “frequent flyers” who may be abusing the system, such as a petitioner appealing the 
denial of a third or fourth motion to reopen.  Id. at 194–95.  Lastly, the unit identifies cases that 
would merit from the appointment of pro bono attorneys.  Id. at 195. 
 116. LAW, supra note 112, at 165. 
 117. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 84, at 360. 
 118. Id. at 360. 
 119. LAW, supra note 112, at 157. 
 120. Id. at 167–68. 
 121. Oakley, supra note 100, at 863–64 (describing how, at the time, the Second Circuit 
“limit[ed] dispositions without oral argument to the bare minimum required by circumstances 
independent of court control,” such as cases involving pro se incarcerated litigants in which both 
parties waive appeal and the presiding judge on the panel agrees); see also Stacy Caplow, After the 
Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal Immigration Appeals, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 9 
(2012); Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 297, 307 (1986) (noting that “every circuit but the Second utilizes some sort of screening 
procedure to identify appeals on which argument will not be heard”). 
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that the cases are not scheduled for oral argument unless specifically ordered by 
the court.122  The court also created an Immigration Unit in the Staff Attorney’s 
Office with approximately twelve staff attorneys who prepare bench memoranda 
on petitions for review to assist the NAC.123  When it is time to vote on 
immigration cases, the judges use a “round robin” method with no 
deliberation.124  Due largely to these new procedures in immigration cases, the 
number of unpublished summary orders the court issued doubled between 2002 
and 2008.125  Nonetheless, these changes do not seem to have increased the speed 
at which the circuit closes its immigration cases relative to other courts. 
In October 2012, the Second Circuit implemented a completely new 
procedure for handling immigration cases.126  The court based its new system on 
the Obama administration’s policy of granting prosecutors the discretion to 
prioritize removal cases.  The new executive branch policy instructs ICE to not 
use its limited resources to deport “low-priority” individuals and provides a list 
of factors to use in deciding who is and is not a high priority.127  Consequently, 
the Second Circuit now tolls all immigration petitions for ninety days, holding 
off on the usual briefing schedule to give the parties time to try to reach an 
agreement about whether the case should be remanded for administrative closure 
under the prosecutorial discretion policy.128  Either party may end the tolling 
early.129  Absent a request to end the tolling, the court will presume that the 
informal stay of removal will continue.130 
The Second Circuit’s new process is striking because it indicates that the court 
sees little harm in extending the timeline of an appeal and significantly delaying 
deportation in the process.  Already slow in comparison to other circuits, the 
Second Circuit has now added up to three months to its average resolution time 
                                                 
 122. 2D CIR. R. 34.2(c); see Caplow, supra note 121, at 9; Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge 
Hits and You Never Saw the Storm: Asylum Overload and the Second Circuit, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 
547, 554 (2007); John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit’s “New Asylum Seekers”: Responses to an 
Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 975 (2006); Rivero, supra note 89, at 
1521. 
 123. See Caplow, supra note 121, at 10. 
 124. See Levy, supra note 101, at 350. 
 125. See Caplow, supra note 121, at 10–11.  The Second Circuit issued summary orders in 147 
of the 150 immigration-related cases decided in June 2009 (99.1%), and all but five of these 
summary orders denied or dismissed the petition for review, an affirmance rate of 96.6%.  This is 
nearly identical to the affirmance rate of 97% in our sample. 
 126. This procedure was not in place for the cases sampled in our research. 
 127. Matter of Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, 702 F.3d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Memorandum from John Morton, 
Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All Special 
Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel 4 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum], 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo. 
pdf. 
 128. Matter of Immigration Petitions, 702 F.3d at 161. 
 129. Id. at 162. 
 130. Id. 
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of immigration cases, while at the same time expecting the forbearance against 
removal to continue during that time. 
The Second Circuit has effectively turned the tables on the government in the 
debate over frivolous appeals.  The court’s order fails to acknowledge the 
government’s concern about frustrating immigration enforcement or the 
possibility that immigrants abuse the appellate process.  Instead, the Second 
Circuit faults the government for pursuing too many removal orders, and 
complains that in many cases in which it upholds a removal order, the 
government fails to execute the deportation.131  The court explained that “it is 
wasteful to commit judicial resources to immigration cases when circumstances 
suggest that, if the Government prevails, it is unlikely to promptly effect the 
petitioner’s removal.”132   The Second Circuit thus has a very different 
understanding of the problem than the Nken Court, which expressed worry about 
noncitizens’ abuse of the appellate process.  The Second Circuit’s insight that 
both sides may have a tendency to over-litigate is an essential piece of context 
to consider. 
G.  Efficiency Versus Accuracy 
One of our clearest findings is that courts’ sorting and decision procedures can 
have a significant impact on the duration of their cases.  However, changing 
these procedures may also affect the quality of decision-making, especially if 
speed depends on limiting the ability of the parties to develop arguments and 
curtailing the time for judges to deliberate.  Appellate courts should have a clear 
understanding of these potential tradeoffs.  As the Supreme Court stated in Nken, 
the goal of having a stay system is to avoid the need to administer “justice on 
the fly.”133  Several procedures designed to promote efficiency may affect a 
court’s accuracy in identifying the cases that deserve a stay.  Because our prior 
research reveals high rates of false negative and false positive decisions on stays 
and the government’s main objection to stays centers on delay, we are especially 
interested in how particular procedures may involve tradeoffs between speed 
and accuracy. 
We focus on four procedural factors that may influence both the duration and 
accuracy of rulings on stay motions: (1) the number of judges that decide the 
motion for stay (ranging from zero—a decision rendered by a clerk—to three); 
(2) the amount of explanation provided in the decision; (3) the level of reliance 
on staff attorneys; and (4) the manner of voting.  There is good reason to believe 
that reducing the number of decision-makers and dispensing with explanations 
increases the speed of adjudication.  After all, the BIA adopted these very 
procedures after streamlining and began processing appeals in one third of the 
                                                 
 131. See id. at 160. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009). 
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amount of time that it previously needed.134  The number of decision-makers 
who rule on the stay and the amount of explanation in the decision are both 
variables that we could observe from PACER cases, so we are able to include 
some quantitative information in our discussion of these factors.  The analysis 
of the third and fourth factors is more qualitative in nature. 
1.  Panel Size 
The three-judge panel system for adjudicating appeals is designed to reduce 
error and promote better decisions; the interaction among judges forces them to 
justify their reasoning, helps reduce the influence of ideology and individual 
subjectivity, draws attention to important issues that individual judges may have 
initially overlooked, and leads judges to refine or even change their views.135  
Indeed, through the process of deliberation, judges “often come to see things 
they did not at first see and to be convinced of views they did not at first 
espouse.”136  A single judge acting alone does not have the benefit of these 
“checks” on his or her reasoning.137  At the same time, involving multiple judges 
in the decision-making process may increase the amount of time necessary to 
reach a decision on the stay or lengthen the overall duration of the appeal, 
especially if other steps, such as issuing a briefing schedule, are put on hold until 
                                                 
 134. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 50 & fig.8. 
 135. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 42 (1994) (explaining that if each judge has a 
50% chance of arriving at the “correct” answer, then the larger the panel, the more likely it will 
collectively arrive at the right result); Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal 
Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 924 (1989) 
(“Assigning several judges to a problem reduces the risk that important lines of analysis will escape 
attention.”); Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 433, 462–63 (2011) (“[U]sing multiple judges decreases the possibility that ideology will 
drive the decision because multiple judges temper the ideological bent a single judge may bring to 
a case, assuming the panel includes judges of varied viewpoints”); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects 
of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1660 (2003) (describing 
“the give and take of collegial deliberation, during which a judge’s approach to a case must 
withstand careful scrutiny and criticism from his or her colleagues” and observing that this 
interaction often leads judges to shift their initial views on the case); Feinberg, supra note 121, at 
300 (exploring how a persuasive memo by one member of a panel often has the power to change 
the votes of one or both of the other judges on the panel); Joy Milligan, Note, Pluralism in America: 
Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1206, 1234 (2006) (discussing research demonstrating that “judges within panels may learn from 
one another’s ideas and worldviews”). 
 136. Edwards, supra note 135, at 1660–61. 
 137. For example, after the streamlining of the BIA’s procedures, single members of the BIA 
made many decisions that three-member panels previously made.  Three-member panel decisions 
made during fiscal years 2004 through 2006 favored the noncitizen in 52% of cases, whereas single-
member decisions made during the same time period favored the noncitizen in only 7% of cases.  
See GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 10.  As of 2009, over 90% of BIA decisions were single-
member decisions.  See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Practice Before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals: Recent Roundtable and Additional Practice Tips, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2009, 2010 
(2009). 
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the court makes a decision on the stay.  Thus, the size of the panel that rules on 
the stay may involve a tradeoff between speed and accuracy. 
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 18(a)(2)(D), a motion for a stay 
pending review of an agency’s decision “normally will be considered by a panel 
of the court,” but may be considered by a single judge “in an exceptional case in 
which time requirements make that procedure impracticable.”138  The local rules 
and internal operating procedures of several circuits stress the presumption that 
a panel of judges will adjudicate the motion.139  In our sample, three-judge panels 
decided the majority of stay motions (58.6%).140  Two-judge panels decided an 
additional 15.7% of cases, while decisions by a single judge were extremely 
uncommon, comprising only 1% of cases.141  Surprisingly, clerks decided nearly 
one quarter of the motions (24.7%), without any judge’s name on the decision.  
Figure 7 below shows the percentage of cases in each circuit decided by clerks, 
one judge, two judges, and three judges. 
 
                                                 
 138. FED. R. APP. P. 18(a)(2)(D). 
 139. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 27(e) (“There is a strong presumption that the Court will act, in all 
but routine procedural matters, through panels or en banc. . . .  Application to a single judge should 
be made only in exceptional circumstances where action by a panel would be impractical due to 
the requirements of time.”); 6TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 27(a)(1) (“In cases not yet assigned 
to a merits panel, substantive motions are assigned to randomly assembled panels.”); 10TH CIR. R. 
8.3(A) (stating that “Application[s] to a single judge . . . [are] disfavored except in an emergency.”); 
10TH CIR. R. 18 (“Applications for stay[s] must comply with Rule 8.”). 
 140. Three-judge panels decided 638 out of 1085 stay motions. 
 141. Two-judge panels decided 170 out of 1085 stay motions.  Eleven were decided by a single 
judge. 
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FIGURE 7: PANEL SIZE DECIDING MOTIONS FOR STAYS BY CIRCUIT 
 
Three-judge panels decided over 90% of the stay motions in the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.  They also decided the vast majority of stay motions 
in the First Circuit (71%), Second Circuit (77%), and Eighth Circuit (84%).  In 
the remaining circuits, the percentage of three-judge decisions was significantly 
lower: 37% of decisions in the Third Circuit, 15% of decisions in the Eighth 
Circuit, 4% of decisions in the Ninth Circuit, and 4% of decisions in the Tenth 
Circuit.  Two-judge panels issued a significant percentage of the decisions on 
stays in Ninth (29%), Third (53%), and Tenth (88%) circuits.142  In the remaining 
circuits, two-judge panels issued decisions in between 0% and 3% of cases.  The 
circuits with the highest percentages of decisions by clerks are the First (28%), 
Ninth (67%), and Eighth (85%) Circuits.  In the Ninth Circuit, 41% of the 
decisions by clerks involved cases in which the government did not file an 
opposition to the stay motion, which automatically results in a grant under the 
court’s General Order 6.4(c).143  In the Eighth Circuit, in which clerks decide 
                                                 
 142. The Ninth Circuit rules provide that substantive motions that do not dispose of the appeal, 
such as motions for stays, are presented to two judges.  If the two judges are in agreement, they 
ordinarily decide the motion.  A third judge participates only if the other two judges disagree or 
request the participation of the third judge, or if one of them is disqualified or unavailable.  See 9th 
Cir. Advisory Committee Note to R. 27-1(3)(c); see also 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.3(g)(1)(iii).  
Three-judge panels did not decide any of the Ninth Circuit stay motions in our sample. 
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most stay motions, the local rules actually suggest that three-judge panels should 
make these decisions.144 
There does not appear to be any statistically significant relationship between 
the size of the panel that rules on the stay motion and the duration of the 
appeal.145  The Tenth Circuit, which relies heavily on two-judge panels, and the 
Eighth Circuit, which relies heavily on clerks, did not process appeals more 
quickly than the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which rely primarily on three judge 
panels.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, which relies on both clerks and two-judge 
panels, took an average of one to two months longer to render a decision than 
several circuits that only use three-judge panels.  This suggests that reducing the 
size of the panel that rules on the stay does not increase efficiency in adjudicating 
the appeal. 
Our results also do not suggest a clear relationship between panel size and 
accuracy.  In the Third Circuit, which relies heavily on two-judge panels for stay 
motions, we found a statistically significant association between a granted stay 
motion and an ultimately successful appeal.146  In fact, the Third Circuit was our 
most “accurate” circuit, with no false negatives and a low rate of false 
positives.147  Yet, in the Tenth Circuit, which also relies primarily on two-judge 
panels, we found a statistically significant association between a denied stay and 
an ultimately successful appeal, making it one of the least “accurate” circuits.148  
The Ninth Circuit, which also frequently uses two-judge panels, falls somewhere 
in the middle in terms of accuracy, granting stays to about half of the petitioners 
who ultimately prevailed.149  Thus, use of a two-judge panel itself does not seem 
to have a significant impact on accuracy. 
Given the constraints on the judiciary’s time and resources and the need to 
make decisions on stay requests relatively quickly, it is understandable that 
courts sometimes—or typically—permit two rather than three judges to make 
these decisions.150  However, we recognize that allowing clerks to rule on stay 
motions can be problematic.  In the absence of a procedural rule that dictates a 
particular result, the use of clerks is inconsistent with Rule 18(a)(2)(D).  
                                                 
 144. 8TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. (I)(D)(3).  The fact that the vast majority of stay 
motions in the Eighth Circuit are decided by clerks is particularly odd because the court’s local 
rules provide that administrative panels consisting of three judges are supposed to rule on stays 
pending appeal.  See id. 
 145. We calculated a correlation of .06.  If we removed the decisions by clerks from the 
analysis, the correlation is -.05, which also is not significant. 
 146. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 381–83. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 384. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Other countries, such as England and Australia, which traditionally allowed only  
three-judge panels, now also permit fewer judges to make decisions in certain types of cases to 
conserve judicial resources.  See Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 59(2) (Eng.); Australian Law 
Reform Comm’n, Report No. 89, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System 
§ 7.41 (2000). 
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Although it is possible that judges may be involved “behind the scenes” in these 
decisions, the lack of individual accountability is worrisome.  If judges cannot 
be held accountable for their decisions, then the incentive to make well-reasoned 
decisions decreases.  Noting that the Eighth Circuit denied a stay to every person 
in our sample who ultimately prevailed in his appeal, we question whether the 
lack of individual accountability—or the frequency of decision-making by non-
judges in that circuit—may be actively contributing to erroneous decisions 
without even the benefit of reducing delay.151 
2.  Explanation of Reasoning 
Writing a decision that explains the court’s reasoning takes time.  In drafting 
published decisions, which carry the weight of precedent and affect the 
reputations of their authors, judges generally strive to provide a coherent and 
persuasive explanation of how they arrived at a particular result.152  This is 
especially likely to be true if they think that the issue may be reheard en banc or 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, although such occurrences are quite rare.  On 
the other hand, the stakes are much lower in drafting unpublished decisions, as 
well as the level of written explanation.153  Unpublished decisions are criticized 
as “potentially plagued by cursory reasoning, imprecise wording, and 
incomplete fact descriptions.”154  Although writing is time consuming, it also 
helps to avoid making rushed decisions under pressure, which changes cognitive 
processes in profound ways.155  Being in a hurry leads judges to use less 
information, give more weight to negative information, and ultimately make less 
accurate judgments.156 
                                                 
 151. The Eighth Circuit was also among the courts that offered no explanation whatsoever for 
its decisions, which may exacerbate the risk of making poor decisions. 
 152. See Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time,  
6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
 153. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 165 (1996) (noting the criticism that 
unpublished opinions encourage sloppy judicial decision-making); Brian T. Damman, Guess My 
Weight: What Degree of Disparity is Currently Recognized Between Published and Unpublished 
Opinions, and Does Equal Access to Each Form Justify Equal Authority for All?, 59 DRAKE L. 
REV. 887, 912–13 (2011). 
 154. Niketh Velamoor, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 to Require that 
Circuits Allow Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 561, 573–74 (2004). 
 155. Anne Edland & Ola Svenson, Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure: 
Studies and Findings, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING 27, 36–37 (Ola Svenson & A. John Maule eds., 1993); see also Dan Zakay, The Impact 
of Time Perception Processes on Decision Making under Time Stress, in TIME PRESSURE, supra, 
at 59, 67 (“[D]ecision making under time stress is actually decision making with limited resources.  
The noxious impact of limited resources on cognitive performance in various domains is well 
documented . . . .”). 
 156. Edland & Svenson, supra note 155, at 28–29, 36; see also Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias 
and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 431–32 (2011) (discussing how time, pressure, 
and stress can have a negative impact on the decisions of immigration judges). 
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Of course, many “unpublished” opinions are now publicly accessible on 
databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, so judges may have more of an interest in 
presenting a cogent explanation for their decisions.  But the types of decisions 
that we focus on here—interim decisions on stays of removal—are genuinely 
unpublished and are available only through the cases’ dockets in PACER.  Most 
of the orders on motions for stays that we looked analyzed little to no reasoning.  
In fact, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits almost 
exclusively issued single sentence denials or grants of motions for stays.  
Although these courts sometimes stated that the petitioner had failed to satisfy 
the standard in Nken or a relevant circuit court case, they generally failed to 
provide any explanation whatsoever.  Similarly, the First, Third, and Tenth 
Circuits frequently did not explain their rulings on motions for stay, although in 
some cases the judges did provide a specific reason, such as failure to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. 
The Sixth Circuit was unique in routinely explaining its decisions on stays.  
Its orders generally explained the type of relief that the petitioner was seeking, 
summarized the arguments that the petitioner made in support of the stay, and 
provided a brief analysis of those arguments.  None of the other circuits that we 
examined came close to this level of detail.  The reasoned decisions that the 
Sixth Circuit issues may contribute to the longer duration of appeals in that court 
(an average of thirteen months, longer than any of the other circuits).  At the 
same time, the practice of issuing reasoned orders on stays likely contributes to 
the Sixth Circuit’s striking success in granting stays to all of the petitioners in 
our sample who ultimately prevailed in their appeals.  As Professor and law 
school Dean Chris Guthrie and his colleagues explained, “the discipline of 
opinion writing might enable well-meaning judges to overcome their intuitive, 
impressionistic reactions” because judges generally will be more careful, 
logical, and deductive in their decisions if they must write them.157 
Recognizing practical limitations, we do not suggest that courts should always 
provide detailed decisions on stays, but we do recommend that they provide at 
least some explanation.  At a minimum, courts should explain which part(s) of 
the four-factor test dictates the result.  This minimal amount of reasoning would 
clarify how the legal standard is being applied in circuits in which the standard 
is currently ambiguous, increase accountability for these high stakes decisions, 
and give practitioners an opportunity to learn how the court applies the doctrine.  
In addition, requiring some explanation would help to prevent judges from 
making decisions based on implicit bias or extraneous factors, such as 
perceptions about high rates of asylum fraud among certain nationalities, instead 
of engaging in an individualized analysis of the case at hand.158  Writing a few 
                                                 
 157. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 37 (2007) (citations  omitted). 
 158. To what extent judges should consider the low base rate of success in immigration appeals 
(around 10%) in assessing an individual appeal’s likelihood of success is an interesting question.  
Cases suggest that judges sometimes improperly rely on general information, such as reports about 
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sentences or a short paragraph explaining the judge’s reasoning should not be a 
very time-consuming task, and it may lead to better-quality decision-making. 
3.  Reliance on Staff Attorneys 
Deliberation takes time, but it has the power to change the outcome of a 
decision.  The nature and quality of deliberation often depends on the decision-
making procedures.  In dealing with motions, including motions for stays of 
removal, many courts rely heavily on staff attorneys to research and assess the 
arguments and have adopted a case management, rather than deliberative, 
approach.159  Reliance on staff attorneys may improve efficiency, but it also has 
the potential to compromise quality. 
The role that staff attorneys play in briefing judges about the merits of motions 
varies from circuit to circuit.  In the Ninth Circuit, in which the correlation 
between stays and petitions granted was weaker than in the Third and Sixth 
Circuits, staff attorneys orally present the motions and proposed dispositions to 
the judges.160  Judges may request supporting documents before the screening 
sessions, but very few do so.161  Moreover, only in “complex matters” do the 
motions attorneys prepare “legal memoranda” in advance of the oral 
presentation.162  Judges usually receive such materials at the screening panel 
meeting, not in advance.163  Staff attorneys in the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits also make oral presentations in some cases.164 
Oral presentations may compromise the accuracy of decision-making because 
the judges are more likely to rely on intuition when listening than when reading, 
                                                 
the high incidence of fraud among Chinese asylum seekers, when assessing the merits of an 
individual case.  See Uchimiya, supra note 18, at 404–10.  Yet the general cognitive tendency is to 
neglect statistical base rates in predicting the likelihood of an event.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside 
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 810 (2001) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 153, 156–58 
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)) (arguing that “the representativeness heuristic might account 
for judges’ apparent preference for individuating evidence (e.g., eyewitness testimony) over 
statistical evidence (e.g., base rates)”). 
 159. Brett G. Scharffs, Law As Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2320 (2001); see also ANTHONY 
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 342 (1993) (criticizing this way of thinking as transforming 
judging from “statesmanship [to something] requiring only administrative skill”). 
 160. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.2(d); 9th Cir. Advisory Committee Note to R. 27-1(3).  The 
General Order indicates that “[f]or some motions, the moving papers will be sent to the panel in 
advance of presentation,” suggesting that, in most cases, the judges do not see the written briefs 
submitted by the parties.  9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.2(d) (emphasis added). 
 161. Anna O. Law, The Ninth Circuit’s Internal Adjudicative Procedures and Their Effect on 
Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 647, 674 (2011). 
 162. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.2(d). 
 163. Law, supra note 161, at 674–75.  If judges request more time to review a case, it is put 
over only briefly (for a few hours or for a day).  Id. at 675.  Such requests are rare.  Id. 
 164. Oakley, supra note 100, at 905–07.  In the Fourth Circuit, as in the Ninth Circuit, staff 
attorneys do not prepare explanatory memoranda, but instead orally present key facts and issues 
and respond to questions from the judges.  Id. at 906, 909.  On the other hand, in the Tenth Circuit, 
oral presentations supplement rather than supersede traditional bench memoranda.  Id. at 906, 913. 
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which can lead to errors in judgment.  Judges may miss important points that 
they would recognize if they had written documents that they could read 
carefully and review later.  As the Ninth Circuit’s Chief Judge Alex Kozinski 
acknowledged, “[a]fter you decide a few dozen such cases on a screening 
calendar, your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders, and the urge to say O.K. to 
whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible.”165  Other Ninth 
Circuit judges have likewise expressed concerns about cases “‘slipping through 
the cracks’” because they do not receive sufficient attention.166  These statements 
suggest that overreliance on the oral presentations of staff attorneys may 
compromise the quality of decision-making. 
Unfortunately, we could not measure how much time courts save by using 
procedures such as oral presentation of motions by staff attorneys.  Future 
research is necessary in this area.  However, even if these procedures 
substantially increase efficiency, such gains do not justify allowing judges to 
abdicate their role in evaluating motions that may result in the deportation—or 
death—of the petitioner.167  The high rate of false negatives and false positives 
that we documented in stay adjudications underscores the need for greater 
accountability in decision-making.  Delegating these decisions to staff attorneys 
whose work remains “silent, unseen, and unknown” undermines such 
accountability.168  Part of the solution may be to add more judges to the courts 
of appeals rather than continue the long-time trend of adding more staff attorneys 
and clerks, whose qualifications, experiences, and responsibilities differ 
significantly from those of judges.169 
4.  Consecutive Voting 
The “round robin” style of voting may save time, but it also undercuts 
deliberation.  The internal operating procedures of both the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits specifically require such consecutive voting by the judges, rather than 
collective deliberation.170  The clerk prepares a single set of motions papers and 
gives them to the initiating judge, who then transmits the file to the next judge 
with a recommendation.171  The second judge then makes a recommendation and 
sends the file to the third judge, who returns the file with a final order to the 
                                                 
 165. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys 
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2007). 
 166. Law, supra note 161, at 664. 
 167. Cf. Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the 
Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justice the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. 
REV. 235, 246 (1998) (“Having a pre-hearing law clerk or staff attorney recast the facts, recast the 
questions presented, recast the arguments of counsel, recommend a disposition, and draft an opinion 
is an inappropriate filtering of advocacy and an inappropriate delegation of judicial 
responsibility.”). 
 168. Id. at 237–38. 
 169. Id. at 237. 
 170. 5TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 27.5; 11TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 1. 
 171. Id. 
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clerk.172  The Fourth Circuit has also standardized this “round robin” 
approach.173  In fact, we observed that the Fourth Circuit’s orders on motions for 
stay routinely stated that one judge issued the order, supported by other judges.  
This suggests that one judge was really responsible for making the decision 
while the other two simply signed on after the fact. 
Some circuits use the “round robin” approach to decide the actual petitions 
for review in immigration cases, as well as motions.174  In the First and Second 
Circuits—and possibly other circuits—the non-argument panels do not meet; 
they simply receive the written materials, such as bench memoranda and 
proposed summary orders prepared by staff attorneys, and then vote sequentially 
on a piece of paper.175  As Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman explained, the 
judges circulate a voting sheet with slots for “Judge 1,” “Judge 2,” and “Judge 
3” and select an option to “refer the petition to the [regular argument calendar], 
deny, grant, remand, or other.”176  The judges on the panel rotate who fills each 
slot, with each judge filling a different slot for one third of the week’s cases.177 
Although the “round robin” approach is meant to increase efficiency, it 
undermines the benefit of having a panel decide the case because the second and 
third judges may be unduly influenced by the recommendations of the first 
judge.178  Concern for collegiality makes judges “highly vulnerable to the 
influence of one another.”179  In addition, judges may be especially susceptible 
to a pervasive cognitive bias known as “anchoring,” which describes how initial 
starting points disproportionately influence subsequent decisions.180  Studies 
show that presenting people with some initial value (the “anchor”) 
unconsciously leads them to make judgments closer to the anchor, even if that 
anchor is completely irrelevant or extreme.181  Such studies have demonstrated 
that anchoring affects judicial determinations of guilt and imposition of 
                                                 
 172. See 5TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 27.5; 11TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 1.  The 
Ninth Circuit specifically rejected this serial screening model, and insisted on operating in 
“parallel.”  See Oakley, supra note 100, at 876. 
 173. See Oakley, supra note 100, at 906. 
 174. Levy, supra note 101, at 350–52. 
 175. Id. at 351. 
 176. Id. at 350. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Oakley, supra note 100, at 876 (“This system saves judicial time when the first judge 
rejects the case from the screening docket without investment of time by the other judges, but once 
the initiating judge has invested time in reviewing the case and preparing a proposed disposition, 
the successive judges may feel less free to moot this effort by rejecting the case from the screening 
docket.”). 
 179. Edwards, supra note 135, at 1661; see also CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED 
DISSENT 166 (2003). 
 180. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128–29 (1974). 
 181. Id. 
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sentences in criminal cases,182 judicial bail determinations,183 awards of 
damages,184 and negotiation outcomes.185 
Anchoring occurs by priming the memory and selectively increasing the 
accessibility of information consistent with the anchor.186  Thus, a judge may 
decide whether to agree with a recommendation to deny a motion for stay of 
removal by mentally testing the possibility that the recommendation is 
appropriate, which would involve selectively retrieving knowledge consistent 
with that recommendation (for example, recalling the weaknesses of the case).187  
Because the judge relies primarily on easily accessible knowledge when it is 
time to make a final decision, previous anchor-consistent knowledge greatly 
influences his judgment.188  Empirical testing would be valuable to determine 
whether the recommendations of fellow judges actually have this type of 
anchoring effect.  The process of sequential decision-making that the Fourth, 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits utilize may explain why these circuits failed to grant 
stays in the vast majority of cases where the petitioner prevailed.189 
By contrast, the Third Circuit, is the most “accurate” in terms of granting stays 
to the petitioners who subsequently prevail on appeal while denying them to 
most of the petitioners who ultimately lose, explicitly rejected the “round robin” 
style of voting.190  Although the Third Circuit judges do not necessarily meet as 
a group to decide a motion, their court procedures provide more opportunity for 
                                                 
 182. See Francisca Fariña et al., Anchoring in Judicial Decision-Making, 7 PSYCHOL. IN SPAIN 
56, 57, 60–61 (2003) (finding anchoring effects in judicial determinations of guilt and imposition 
of sentences); see also Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: 
Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1540–41, 1544,  
1546–47 (2001) (reporting that even highly experienced German criminal trial judges anchor 
sentences to the demands of the prosecutor). 
 183. See Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making and Information 
Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 817–18 
(1975) (finding that judges anchor heavily on prosecutors’ bail recommendations, even after 
controlling for defendants’ criminal records, local ties, and the severity of the crimes). 
 184. See Guthrie et al., supra note 158, at 792 (finding that “the judges in [the] study relied on 
an anchor—the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum raised by the motion to dismiss—to estimate 
damage awards in a hypothetical personal-injury case”); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges 
Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberate Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1251, 1285–91 (2005) (finding anchoring effects in the compensatory damages awarded by trial 
judges, based on the demands made by the plaintiff’s lawyer in the pre-trial settlement conference). 
 185. Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New 
Insights From Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 621 (2006) (using a  
meta-analysis to demonstrate that “anchoring has a powerful influence on negotiation outcomes”). 
 186. Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 182, at 1548. 
 187. Id. (providing an analogous example of judges and criminal sentencing). 
 188. Id. 
 189. We note that the Eighth Circuit also had a high rate of false negatives; it failed to grant a 
stay in any of the cases in which it granted a petition in our sample.  It is not clear if the Eighth 
Circuit also uses sequential voting. 
 190. Levy, supra note 101, at 351.  The Third Circuit rejected “round robin” voting because of 
concerns of undue influence.  Id. 
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original and independent analysis by each judge on the panel, both because they 
do not vote consecutively and because they rely less on staff attorneys.191  This 
may contribute to the court’s high level of accuracy in adjudicating stays. 
Our data also raises questions about whether the “round robin” approach 
actually speeds up the adjudication of appeals.  If we set aside the Second 
Circuit, which takes a particularly long time, the average duration of appeals in 
the other circuits that we know use consecutive voting (the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Eleventh) is about 7.5 months.  This is faster than the Third Circuit, which 
has rejected consecutive voting and takes an average of nine months to resolve 
immigration appeals.  If we include the Second Circuit, the average duration of 
appeals in circuits that use consecutive voting increases to 8.4 months, which is 
closer to the average duration in the Third Circuit.  A better understanding of the 
procedures used in the remaining circuits is necessary to assess whether the 
“round robin” approach is really associated with faster decisions.  However, 
even assuming that consecutive voting helps process cases more quickly, a brief 
reduction in delay may not justify an increased risk of error. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on our results, we make recommendations to the judiciary (the Supreme 
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals) and the executive (the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security) branches. 
A.  Combining a Temporary Automatic Stay with an Effective Case 
Management System 
Relatively simple procedural reforms can go a long way to increase the 
efficiency of the appeals process and improve the quality and consistency of 
decisions on stays of removal.  One crucial area for reform is the procedures that 
courts use to identify frivolous or flawed appeals soon after they are filed.  The 
effective screening processes that some courts have developed can serve as 
models for other courts.  Promoting early identification of clearly flawed appeals 
is the best way to prevent abuse of the legal process and preserve judicial 
resources for evaluating meritorious cases.  For example, courts should promptly 
issue Orders to Show Cause in cases in which the court appears to lack 
jurisdiction over the appeal, the petitioner has not paid the filing fee, or the case 
has some other fatal flaw. 
We recommend combining procedures for early screening of appeals with a 
temporary automatic stay of removal to give the court the time necessary to make 
a reasoned decision on a motion for stay.  Although the two courts that currently 
offer temporary automatic stays—the Second and Ninth Circuits—do receive far 
more stay motions than other circuits, we found that stay motions, by 
themselves, do not prolong the duration of an appeal.  Given the overall high 
                                                 
 191. Id.  Immigration panels review all of the immigration cases in the Third Circuit; they are 
not “screened” by staff attorneys. 
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rates of false negatives and false positives that we have reported in our previous 
study,192 a temporary automatic stay would offer an important safety measure 
against rushed decision-making. 
This temporary stay can be implemented by adopting a rule similar to Ninth 
Circuit General Order 6.4(c), which directs the court to rule on the merits of the 
stay if the government opposes it.193  To facilitate prompt decision-making, the 
rule should include strict deadlines for filing a response and mandate that failure 
to respond will be construed as non-opposition.  Temporary automatic stays both 
preserve judicial resources and protect petitioners by giving judges time to 
search for the “needles in the haystack.”  If coupled with a mechanism to speed 
the dismissal of flawed appeals, automatic temporary stays would not 
unreasonably open the door to abusive appeals. 
B.  Using Prosecutorial Discretion Policies to Conserve Judicial Resources 
The Second Circuit has challenged the government by recognizing that a 
relatively small percentage of noncitizens with outstanding orders of removal 
are actually deported from the United States.  The court has raised compelling 
questions about why the judiciary should spend precious resources adjudicating 
immigration appeals filed by petitioners who are not a high priority for removal 
under the Obama administration’s prosecutorial discretion policies.194  The 
Second Circuit’s approach of providing a ninety-day period for the government 
and petitioner to attempt to agree on administrative closure should serve as a 
good experiment to test whether the court’s assertive stance by the court will 
motivate the Department of Homeland Security to implement its own policies.  
So far, only about 2% of removal cases nationwide have been administratively 
closed under the prosecutorial discretion policies.195 
If the Department of Homeland Security refuses to administratively close 
cases, an alternative (or complementary) approach would be for the Department 
of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) to decline to oppose stay 
motions filed by “low priority” petitioners.  Because these individuals should 
not be targeted for deportation in the first place, staying their removal should be 
uncontroversial.  This would test whether OIL is willing to change its practice 
of actively opposing the vast majority of stay motions based on the Obama 
administration’s priorities.  For example, OIL could establish a practice of filing 
                                                 
 192. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 392. 
 193. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 6.4(c). 
 194. See Morton Memorandum, supra note 127, at 1–2; see also Memorandum from John 
Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs, to All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents 
in Charge, All Chief Counsel 1–2 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure 
-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf. 
 195. See ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Programs, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/287/ (last updated June 28, 2012) (finding that the number 
of prosecutorial discretion cases amounted to only 1.9% of the 298,173 cases that were pending 
before immigration courts as of the end of September 2012). 
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prompt notices of non-opposition to stay motions in cases in which the petitioner 
has no criminal record, does not represent a threat to public safety, or otherwise 
does not fall into any of the “high priority” categories.196 
As Justice Kennedy observed in Nken, empirical data is essential for courts to 
find a balanced approach to adjudicating immigration appeals.197  We have 
attempted to fill this need by analyzing PACER data.  However, the government 
can assist the courts by publishing the percentage of removal orders issued by 
immigration judges that are actually executed each year.  If, as the Second 
Circuit suggests, the number is quite small, concerns about the appeals process 
resulting in undue delay of deportations would be greatly undermined. 
C.  Adopting a Flexible Stay Standard that Minimizes Errant Deportations 
Our study has shown that immigration appeals usually take well under one 
year and that the appeals that seem most likely to be abusive—those dismissed 
for jurisdictional and procedural reasons—have especially short lives.  We have 
also observed that many flawed appeals are dismissed in less than three months. 
This suggests that courts should prioritize preventing false negatives over 
preventing false positives because deportations in weak appeals are likely to be 
delayed by only a matter of months.  The sliding scale approach, which 
correlates to a reduction in the rate of false negatives from 57% to 28%, achieves 
this result.198 
D.  Deterring Abusive Appeals by Detecting Problematic Patterns of Behavior 
Rather than Trying to Scrutinize Individual Cases 
Courts have a hard time defining, much less identifying, “frivolous” appeals.  
Looking for problematic patterns of behavior by repeat players is a more 
effective way to weed out abusive appeals than engaging in the impossible task 
of assessing the merits of an individual case at the onset of litigation to determine 
whether the arguments are genuinely frivolous or just weak.  Issuing local rules 
aimed at discouraging and sanctioning behavior, such as failing to file timely 
briefs or respond to Orders to Show Cause, is an effective first step.  Those local 
rules can then be combined with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 46 and 
38, as the Second Circuit has done, to discipline and sanction attorneys who 
engage in a pattern of abusive behavior.199  The goal is to ensure that the court’s 
case management procedures keep track of each missed deadline or withdrawn 
appeal in a meaningful way.  Courts could consider publishing periodic reports 
with the names of attorneys who have three or more incidents of problematic 
                                                 
 196. In Justice on the Fly, we not only found high rates of opposition in most circuits, but also 
that the government had opposed the motion for stay in the majority of cases in which it 
subsequently filed a motion to remand, acknowledging that the appeal had merit.  See Marouf, 
Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 378. 
 197. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762–63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 198. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, at 389. 
 199. See 2D CIR. R. 38.1. 
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behavior (for example, three missed deadlines for filing briefs) in order to ensure 
that abusive behavior it promptly detected. 
E.  Reexamining the Procedures Used to Rule on Motions 
Although different courts have different procedures for ruling on motions, 
there has been little empirical research on how these various procedures actually 
affect the efficiency and the quality of decision-making.  Courts must give these 
issues serious consideration.  For instance, courts should write a minimum of a 
few sentences of specific reasoning for decisions on motions.200  Additionally, 
courts that use the “round robin” method of voting should to assess how much 
time is really saved by this practice and to evaluate the potential risks associated 
with it.  Courts should also examine their level of reliance on staff attorneys, 
including reliance on oral presentations by staff to rule on motions.  Finally, 
courts should not allow clerks to sign decisions on motions for stays of removal.  
This practice not only contradicts the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure but 
also undermines judicial accountability. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Commentators have expressed concerns about dilatory, delay-seeking 
behavior by litigants for over a hundred years.201  Yet few scholars have 
empirically explored the actual speed of judicial decision-making.202  
Consequently, perceptions about the duration of appeals are often based on false 
assumptions rather than facts and may be clouded by explicit or implicit biases 
related to the nature of the appeal.  There is a particular risk of distortion with 
cases that reach the Supreme Court because such cases take a particularly long 
period of time to resolve.  By contrast, the far larger number of cases dismissed 
on non-merits grounds early in the process are typically invisible. It is a well-
known maxim that the wheels of justice turn slowly. But as it turns out, justice 
is often administered with a fair degree of efficiency. 
Immigration appeals seem particularly susceptible to misperceptions about 
delay due to popular notions about noncitizens filing fraudulent applications.  
However, our study shows that noncitizens cannot routinely buy a significant 
amount of time in the United States simply by filing a federal court appeal.  We 
have shown that immigration appeals in the federal courts generally take well 
under a year, and that those appeals most likely to be frivolous are usually 
                                                 
 200. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 421 (2011) (“Slow, careful, deliberative processes are the key to sound 
judgment, not snap intuition.”). 
 201. See supra note 27. 
 202. See Miles, supra note 92, at 324 (“The speed of court decision-making deserves more 
study. . . . Basic facts about how the speed of decision-making varies across circuits, areas of law, 
and their intersection with judicial experience await exploration.”).  Miles’s article is one of the 
few empirical pieces addressing this topic. 
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dismissed in less than six months.  Many are even dismissed in less than three 
months. 
To be clear, immigration adjudication in the United States does take 
considerable time, but most of that time is taken by the first instance adjudication 
within the Department of Justice’s Immigration Courts.  Cases pend in 
immigration courts nationwide for an average 550 days.203  In California alone, 
the average immigration court delay is 700 days.204  This data suggests that the 
federal appeals stage may actually be the fastest part of the removal process.  
Those concerned with delay should focus their attention on how long cases are 
taking in immigration courts, in which judges regularly continue cases for years.  
Both the government and immigrants with meritorious cases have a shared 
interest in making this process more efficient.205 
Our conclusion has implications for how aggressively the Department of 
Justice should fight motions for stays of removal, how liberally courts should 
grant them, and what doctrinal approach they should adopt.  If appeals do not 
take very long and judges cannot predict cases will succeed, courts should set a 
flexible standard for stays and only allow the government to oppose stays in 
cases that clearly abusive.206 
Instead of focusing on stays as an obstacle to immigration enforcement, the 
government should direct its energy toward ensuring that courts have the 
resources and procedures in place to process cases efficiently.  Our results 
demonstrate that courts with effective case management systems are able to 
quickly identify and dismiss cases with fatal flaws, thereby resolving the 
government’s concern about undue delay.  Our study suggests that both case 
management and traditional doctrine must play a role in adjudication.  
Unfortunately, the critical role of case management in the administration of 
justice is not a traditional subject of legal scholarship and appellate judges are 
often unaware of how other courts manage cases.207 
                                                 
 203. Latest Immigration Court Numbers, As Of January 2013, TRAC IMMIGRATION (February 
13, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/308/.  TRAC reports that “[u]nclosed cases now 
in the Court’s backlog have already been waiting on average about a year and a half (550 days) and 
typically will need to wait considerably longer before they are resolved.”  Id.; see also Immigration 
Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court 
_backlog/ (last visited May 22, 2014) (tracking the average length of immigration cases across the 
country). 
 204. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 203. 
 205. Figures from November 2013 show that cases in which relief was granted in the 
immigration court took on average 869 days, cases that were closed due to prosecutorial discretion 
took 875 days, and those that were terminated took 561 days, whereas those in which a removal 
order was issued took only 261 days.  Id. 
 206. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 5, 398–99. 
 207. See Levy, supra note 101, at 317–18 (discussing the void in knowledge about federal 
appellate courts’ case management systems and analyzing the practice of five circuits using 
qualitative research from a series of interviews). 
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Recognizing the importance of proper court staffing and procedures is 
particularly important.  The federal courts’ budgets were slashed by 8% during 
federal sequestration.208  Such cuts mean that the judiciary must eliminate 
roughly one quarter of its workforce, which will delay court proceedings and 
compromise the justice system.209  These changes do not bode well for either 
noncitizens or the Justice Department.  Reduced staff coupled with an ever-
increasing caseload could result in lower-quality decision-making, which may 
in turn lead to more stay denials in cases that ultimately prevail on appeal. 
Our results call out for more research on court administration as an integral 
part of our system of law, and suggest that mundane matters such as how courts 
sort their dockets can and should have a significant impact on legal doctrine.  If 
concerns about delay are exaggerated, then it follows that procedural standards 
designed to prevent abuse of the process may be calibrated too strictly.  On the 
specific matter of immigration appeals, this new data suggests that the 
government’s arguments to the Supreme Court in Nken were founded on 
fundamentally false assumptions. 
  
                                                 
 208. See Bruce Moyer, January-February 2013: Federal Courts Brace for Budget Cuts, FED. 
B. ASS’N, http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Washington-Watch/WW-Archives/2013/January 
-February-2013-Federal-Courts-Brace-for-Budget-Cuts.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014). 
 209. Id.; see also Chad Bray, Federal Judges Express ‘Grave Concern’ Over Budget Cuts, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/08/15/federal-judges 
-express-grave-corncern-over-budget-cuts/; Justice Sequestered, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, at 10. 
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APPENDIX A 
The linear regression model below helps to analyze various factors that play 
a role in predicting the duration of appeals. In this model, the coefficient 
indicates the deviation that can be attributed to a single factor if all of the other 
factors are held equal (for example, -2.5 means that the presence of the factor 
will reduce the duration of the case by two and a half months, all other things 
being equal).  The variables marked with stars are those for which there is a 
statistically significant correlation, with three stars indicating a stronger 
correlation. 








t Score   
 




      
Stay Requested 
 
0.3442 0.4215 0.82 .414  
Stay Granted 
  
-0.2556 0.6159 -0.41 .678  
Government 
Opposed Stay 





-2.8126 0.4041 -6.96 .000 *** 
Voluntary 
Dismissal 
-3.2817 0.5419 -6.06 .000 *** 
Petition Granted 
 
0.0390 0.5826 0.07 .947  
IFP Filed -1.6798 0.6354 -2.64 .008 ** 
IFP Granted 0.7423 0.4650 1.60 .111  
Pro Se Litigant -1.8479 0.4107 -4.50 .000 *** 
Asylum Case 1.3226 0.3755 3.52 .000 *** 
Oral Arguments 
 
3.1444 0.6171 5.10 .000 *** 
Panel Party 
Unanimity 
-0.5503 0.3764 -1.46 .144  
Female on Panel 1.0130 0.3609 2.81 .005 ** 
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Constant 8.3448 0.6333 13.83 .000 *** 
N= 1098; F(23,1074) = 27.55, p=.000; R2= .37; Adj. R2= .36; Root MSE = 
4.49 
†Unreported fixed effects circuit variation available upon request (Wald 
F(10,1074) = 11.39 ***) 
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APPENDIX B 
This model analyzes only those cases that the court decided on the merits, 
excluding those dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds. 
 
FIGURE 9: LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL OF DURATION OF CASES DECIDED ON 
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Stay Requested 
 
1.6509 0.6449 2.56 .011 * 
Stay Granted  
 
-0.1043 0.7689 -0.14 .892  
Government 
Opposed Stay 
-1.3588 0.7187 -1.89 .059  
Petition Granted 
 
-0.3518 0.5994 -0.59 .558  
IFP Filed -2.2180 1.4485 -1.53 .126  
IFP Granted 0.6853 0.5648 1.21 .225  
Pro Se Litigant -2.5405 0.5704 -4.45 .000 *** 
Asylum Case 0.9993 0.4044 2.47 .014 ** 
Oral Arguments 
 
3.7063 0.6710 5.52 .000 *** 
Panel Party 
Unanimity 
-0.1134 0.4714 -0.24 .810  
Female on Panel 1.2418 0.4164 2.98 .003 ** 
Constant 7.2967 0.7165 10.18 .000 *** 
N= 610; F(21,618) = 11.12, p=.000; R2= .29; Adj. R2= .27; Root MSE = 
4.70 
†Unreported fixed effects circuit variation available upon request (Wald 
F(10,618) = 13.11 ***) 
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APPENDIX C 
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